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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JANE WALTERS,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.

:

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890671 CA
Category 15

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2)
(h) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court err by establishing a marital

relationship between the parties beginning on or about January 1,
1980/

when the parties did not solemnize their marriage until

October of 1984?
Though the trial court treated the characterization of
the marital relationship as a finding of factf this particular
issue regards a conclusion of law underlying the judgment.
1

The

appellate court is not bound by the trial court's characterization
of its determination as a finding of fact or conclusion of law.
50 West Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake, 124
Utah Adv.Rep. 6 (1989).

To establish the marital relationship in

question, the court had to interpret a statute which presents a
question of law. State ex rel. Division of Consumer Protection v.
Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 127 Utah Adv.Rep. 4 (1990); Henretty v. Manti
City

Corporation,

127

Utah

Adv.Rep.

8

(1990).

In

reviewing

Conclusions of Law, the appellate court accords Conclusions of Law
with no particular

deference but reviews them for correctness.

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985).
II.
including

Did the trial court err in dividing the property

real property acquired by the Defendant prior to the

marriage being solemnized, and Defendant's retirement benefits on
the basis of a one hundred nine

(109) month relationship when

indeed the parties were married for only fifty-two (52) months?
This issue challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact
which is to be set aside on appeal if clearly erroneous.

Utah R.

of Civ. P. 52(a) (as amended, effective January 1, 1987).

The

trial court used equitable principles in dividing the real property
and

retirement

benefits

in question.

The

"clearly erroneous"

standard applies regardless whether action is in equity or at law.
Bountiful v. Riley, 124 Utah Adv.Rep. 15 (1989).
2

The appellate

court may regard a Finding as clearly erroneous if it is induced
by an erroneous view of the law. State v. Walker, 743 P2d 191,193
(Utah 1987).
III.

Did the trial court err in awarding the Plaintiff

ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) attorney's fees though the parties
stipulated that neither party was presently in need of or entitled
to the

continuing

financial

support of

the other, including

alimony?
The proper standard of review is "clearly erroneous" as
this is a challenge of the trial court's Findings of Fact.
R. of Civ. P. 52(a).
appellate

court

Utah

The Finding is clearly erroneous if the

is convinced

that a mistake

has been made.

Bountiful v. Riley, 124 Utah Adv.Rep. 15 (1989).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, §30-1-4.5, §30-1-2

(as amended

1984), and §30-1-17.2 (1971) are the applicable statutes in this
matter, copies of which are included in the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT.

This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce and the
Amended Decree of Divorce of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
in which the Honorable Ray M. Harding, having issued a Memorandum
Decision,

ordered

that

the

Plaintiff/Respondent
3

(Helen

Jane

Walters) was to be awarded for her equitable share of the parties
equity

in realty acquired

by their

joint efforts during

"marriage

like

relationship".

The

Plaintiff

a

proportionate

share

Decree
of

also

their

awarded

the

the

Defendant's

(Defendant/Appellant Lewis Mark Walters) retirement benefits earned
through his employment during the "marriage like relationship".
After

a

trial

on

the

merits,

the

Court

entered

a

Memorandum Decision finding that a "marriage like relationship"
between the parties began on or about January 1, 1980 though the
marriage was not solemnized until October 5, 1984.

During the

period between January 1, 1980 and October 5, 1984, the Defendant
acquired the real property of which was awarded to the Plaintiff.
The

Plaintiff

was

also

awarded

a proportionate

share

of

the

retirement benefits earned by the Defendant during that period of
time.
The trial court entered a subsequent Memorandum Decision
of which the Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees.

This ruling was

incorporated into the Decree of Divorce and the Amended Decree of
Divorce.
The Defendant appeals from the Decree of Divorce and the
Amended
entitled

Decree
to

the

of

Divorce

stating

real property

that

awarded

the

Plaintiff

to her

because

is

not

it

was

acquired by the Defendant during the period between January 1, 1980
4

and October 5, 1984 which was before the solemnization of the
marriage.

Likewise,

the

Plaintiff

is

not

entitled

to

a

proportionate share of the Defendant's retirement benefits earned
by the Defendant during the period between January 1, 1980 and
October

5, 1984.

The Defendant also appeals from the Order

awarding the Plaintiff attorney fees.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELEVANT FACTS.

In December of 1978, the Plaintiff and Defendant met.
(Tr.15).

At that time, the Plaintiff, and her two year old

daughter from a previous marriage, resided in her trailer which was
located in Orem, Utah.

(Tr.30-31). The Defendant, working for the

United States Air Force, was frequently called to work on temporary
duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile sights.
(Tr.92). The Defendant resided in several States from 1978 through
1984 because of these TDY assignments.

During this period, he

resided in Montana, Missouri, South Dakota, Wyoming, and North
Dakota. (Ex.10) (Tr.72-74,92).

While the Defendant resided ir

these several States from 1978 through 1984, he made infrequent
returns to Utah.

(Tr.53).

During this period, the Defendant

maintained a habitable trailer in Highland, Utah, of which the
water, gas, and utilities were always hooked up. (Tr.53-54).
However, when the Defendant would return to Utah, he lived with the
Plaintiff in her trailer.

(Tr.54).
5

In July of 1977, the Defendant acquired real property in
Highland, Utah.

(Tr.94) (Ex.11).

Said final payment for this

property was made by the Defendant

on May

23, 1981.

(Tr.94)

(Ex.14).
When the parties first met, the Plaintiff resided in her
trailer in Orem, Utah.

In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in

his own name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,
Utah.

(Tr.96)

(Ex.15).

At

that

time,

the

Plaintiff's mobile trailer onto that property.

parties

moved

The Defendant paid

for the costs of moving the trailer to the Pleasant Grove location
as

well

as

connections.

the

costs

(Tr.96)

incurred

for

culinary

water

and

sewer

From that time forward, the Plaintiff has

resided in her trailer at that location.
substantial improvements at this sight.

The Defendant paid for

(Tr.37,96). The Defendant

did not charge Plaintiff rent for the placement of her trailer on
the pad or for her use of the realty as her residence.

(Tr.39).

The Plaintiff's resources were used for the everyday necessities
for herself and her daughter such as groceries, utilities, and
trailer payments.

(Tr.39).

Prior to and after the Plaintiff moved her trailer onto
Defendant's lot, the Defendant assisted the Plaintiff by paying a
number of debts and obligations of the Plaintiff's which included
IRS - $4,000.00, State Tax Commission
6

- $2,700.00, payment

on

trailer - $3#000.00, payment on car loan - $400.00, payment on
television

loan

- $150.00, bills

from a Wyoming

accident

-

$1,000.00, and the costs of moving her trailer from Orem to
Pleasant

Grove - $521.00. (Tr.86-88,105-106)

(Ex.13).

These

expenses totalling TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE DOLLARS
($10,371.00) were all paid by the Defendant for the Plaintiff's
behalf of which the Defendant makes no claims for, (Tr.105), and
of which he expected nothing in return.

(Tr.88). At the time the

Defendant paid these expenses, there was not an arrangement with
regard to a marital relationship.
In the Fall of 1981, with the Defendant's knowledge, the
Plaintiff enrolled her daughter in school under the last name of
Walters.

(Tr.42-43,107).
From 1978 through 1983, the Plaintiff filed her tax

returns under the name of Hunter, the name from her previous
marriage.

(Tr.49-52) (Ex.3). Not until 1984, the year the parties

were married, did the parties file a joint tax return.

(Tr.52).

Prior to their marriage in 1984, the Plaintiff and the
Defendant kept separate checking accounts of which the Defendant
never

intermingled his money with the Plaintiff's.

(Tr.58).

Nevertheless, the Defendant would periodically help the Plaintiff
by paying her debts and obligations.

(Tr.58-59) (Ex.13).

In July of 1984, the Plaintiff joined the Defendant in
7

North Dakota where the parties resided together.
October

(Tr.44,72).

On

5, 1984, the parties were married in Manitoba, Canada.

(Tr.ll).
On July 19, 1985, the Defendant, with his own funds,
acquired in his name a parcel of property located at 640 South 50
West in Pleasant Grove, Utah.

(Tr.99) (Ex.11,16).

This property

was in the same trailer park facility as the 625 South 50 West
property of which the parties lived.
placed his trailer on that property.

In October 1985, Defendant
(Tr.100).

Defendant had

purchased such trailer in 1977 which he had kept in Highland, Utah.
(Tr.101).

At the time of trial (February 1989) the 640 South 50

West property had an encumbrance of $5,000.00.
During

the marriage

differences

(Tr.81) (Ex.11).

between

the

parties

developed resulting in their separation on or about November 10,
1987.

(R.149)
At the time the parties met, the Plaintiff was employed

by Geneva Steel.
when

Geneva

This employment continued except for a period

Steel

ceased

operations.

At

the

time

of

trial,

Plaintiff had been reemployed by Geneva Steel for approximately
one (1) year.
Pleasant

Grove,

(Tr.36-37).
Utah,

the

While living at 625 South 50 West,
Plaintiff

contributed

her

earnings

towards the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses. (R.151).

8

On October 26, 1987, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for
divorce.

(R.l). On February 7, 1989, the parties appeared before

the Honorable Ray M. Harding for purposes of terminating the
marriage and dividing real and personal property. (R.3-4).
Following the trial, Judge Harding entered a Memorandum
Decision finding "that the parties began to carry on a marriage
like relationship on or about January 1, 1980, which was several
years before the marriage was actually solemnized." (R.99).
From the established date of January 1, 1980, Judge
Harding

found that the Plaintiff was entitled

to a share of

Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the existence of
the marriage. The formula used to apportion the Plaintiff's share
of the retirement benefits was derived from Marchant v. Marchant,
743 P2d 199, (Utah App. 1987), which awards one-half of the "total
monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator consists
of the number of years or months they were married during which
the Defendant was employed by the federal government

and the

denominator is the total number of years or months Defendant was
in such employment." (R.100).
In regards to the distribution of real property, the
trial court found that the property at issue was partially acquired
before the marriage, and partially after.

Considering when the

properties were obtained, and how they were paid for, the court
9

found

the

following

to be an

equitable

division

of

the

real

property:
The Plaintiff is to receive the property in
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is
located free and clear.
The Defendant may
keep the Highland property which he acquired
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant
Grove property subject to the $5,000.00
encumbrance which is still owing on that
property. (R.101).
On July 31, 1989, the trial court, in a second Memorandum
Decision, awarded the Plaintiff ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00)
for attorney fees "based on need and the relative ability of the
parties

to

represented

pay."

(R.115).

to the Court

Prior
that

to

this

the Plaintiff

decision,
was

it

totally

was
self

supported from income earned from her employment at Geneva Steel,
(R.lll), and as incorporated in the Findings of Fact, it was found
that neither party appeared to be in present need of or entitled
to the continuing financial support of the other, either in the
form of alimony or child support. (R.149).
The

foregoing

Memorandums

were

incorporated

in

the

Amended Decree of Divorce. (R.168).
On November 9, 1989, the Defendant filed his Notice of
Appeal from the Decision rendered by Judge Harding. (R.172).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

State of Utah did

not

recognize an

relationship as a marriage prior to 1987.
10

unsolemnized

The District

Court

established a marital relationship between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant beginning on or about January 1, 1980f though the parties
did not solemnize the marriage until October 5, 1984. The District
Court erred by applying equitable principals to the marriage like
relationship

by

awarding

Plaintiff

a parcel

purchased by the Defendant on May 27, 1980.
also

erred

by

awarding

Plaintiff

a

of

real

estate

The District Court

portion

of

Defendant's

retirement benefits on the basis of an one hundred nine (109) month
relationship though the parties were married legally for only some
fifty-two (52) months.
Before Utah

adopted

§30-1-4.5

in 1987, it did not

recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a marriage, even though
the parties to the relationship may have acted in other respects
as spouses.

§30-1-4.5 is to be applied prospectively and not

retroactively. Therefore, the District Court mischaracterized the
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's relationship as a marriage from
January 1, 1980 until October 5, 1984.
In the alternative, the Defendant claims that there was
not a marriage like relationship prior to the solemnization on
October 5, 1984.

The District Court misconstrued Utah Code Ann.

§30-1-4.5, by determining a marriage under that section more than
one year after the duration of the relationship in question.
Though the decision to award attorney's fees in divorce
11

proceedings rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial
court, the award must be based on evidence of both financial need
and reasonableness.
trial

court.

The

Such evidence was not produced before the
court

relied

on

the Plaintiff's

attorney's

Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees which acknowledged that the
Plaintiff was totally self supported from an income earned from her
present employment.

Thus, there was no financial need for attorney

fees to be awarded.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNSOLEMNIZED RELATIONSHIP FROM JANUARY 1, 1980, UNTIL
OCTOBER 5, 1984, SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNIZED
AS A VALID MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP
A.

Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 enacted in 1987 is to be

applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Though the trial court did not refer directly to Utah
Code Ann. §30-1-4.5,

the Court established that the Plaintiff and

the Defendant "began to carry on a marriage like relationship on
or about January 1, 1980f which was several months before the
marriage was actually solemnized."

The parties eventually did

solemnize their marriage on October 5, 1984.

Because the Court

considered the parties to have begun their marital relationship on
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 is entitled validity of marriage
not solemnized. A copy of which is attached in the Addendum.
12

January 1, 1980, it was determined that the parties were married
for one hundred nine (109)-months.

The Defendant argues that the

length of the marriage was in fact fifty two (52) months, measured
from the time the marriage was solemnized.

(Tr.5).

The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed Utah Code
Ann. §30-1-4.5 in Layton v. Layton, 777 P2d 504 (Utah App. 1989).
In Layton, the Court found that before the adoption of §30-1-4.5
in 1987, "Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized relationship as
a marriage, even though the parties to the relationship may have
acted in other respects as spouses."
determined

that

§30-1-4.5

retroactive, effect.

has

Id. at 505. Also, the Court

only

prospective,

and

not

Id.

In reviewing the property division, the trial court
decided that the property was to be divided according
equitable principals governing divorce actions.

to the

Determining that

the marital relationship began in 1980, the Plaintiff was awarded
the real property located at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,
Utah, free and clear.

(R.101). This property was purchased by the

Defendant in his own name in May of 1980. (Tr.96).

The Defendant

paid for the costs of moving the Plaintiff's trailer to this
location, (Tr.96), and allowed the Plaintiff to reside there rent
free.

(Tr.39).

The

Defendant

also

paid

for

substantial

improvements at this sight. All this was done prior to the parties
13

solemnizing their marriage. The Plaintiff was also awarded a share
of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the existence of
the marriage beginning on January 1, 1980.

(R.100).

The formula

used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of this retirement benefit
comes from Marchant v. Mar chant, 743 P2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
Such formula calls for one-half (50%) of the total amount of all
the Defendant's monthly

benefit payments

be multiplied

by the

fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the denominator is the
total number of months the Defendant is employed by the federal
government.

(R.166).

The numerator of 109 is derived from the

trial court's establishment of a marital relationship beginning on
January lf 1980.
It is apparent that the trial court erred by applying
§30-1-4.5

retroactively.

mischaracterizing

the

This

resulted

relationship

between

in

the
the

trial
parties

marriage from January 1, 1980 until October 5, 1984.

court
as

a

Thus, the

Plaintiff was wrongfully awarded the real property at 625 South 50
West, Pleasant
Marchant

Grove, Utah.

formula

used

Also, the numerator

to award

a proportionate

used
share

in the
of

the

Defendant's retirement benefit should be eliminated or refigured

14

from the date of the solemnization of the marriage.
B.

The Trial Court Erred By Establishing A Marriage Like

Relationship From January 1, 1980 Until October 5, 1984,
Prior to 1987, marriages not solemnized by an authorized
person were prohibited and declared void.

Utah Code Ann. §30-1-2

(3) (1984); In re Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P2d 183 (1946).
See Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988).
In the event it is permissible to recognize a marriage
like relationship between the parties from January 1# 1980 until
October

5, 1984, it is evident

that

the trial court erred

establishing a marriage like relationship.

by

The Court was not at

privy to determine or establish that such a relationship existed.
According to §30-1-4.5,
"(1) A marriage which is not solemnized. . .
shall be legal and valid if a court. . .
establishes that it arises out of a contract
between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a
solemnized marriage under the provisions of
this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually
assume marital rights,
duties, and obligations;
(e) who hold themselves out as and have
acquired a uniform and general reputation as
husband and wife.
The numerator of 109 is the number of months the parties
were married from January 1, 1980.
The appropriate numerator
should be 52, the number of months the parties were married after
the solemnization of the marriage if Plaintiff should share at all.

15

(2) The determination for establishment of a
marriage under this section must occur during
the relationship described in subsection (1),
or within one year following the termination
of that relationship.fl Id. (emphasis added).
As subsection (2) points out, the determination for the
establishment

of a common

law marriage must

occur during

such

relationship/ or within one year following the termination of that
relationship.

The relationship in question from January 1, 1980

up until October 5, 1984 was not determined or established to be
a

common

law marriage until February

15, 1989.

(R.99).

This

determination was more than four (4) years after the solemnization
of the marriage.
It is also evident that the parties themselves did not
recognize that a binding marriage like relationship existed prior
to October 5, 1984.

Prior to the marriage, the Defendant resided

in several States making infrequent returns to Utah.
74,92).
returns

From
under

marriage.

1978 through

1983, the Plaintiff

the name of Hunter, the name from

(Tr.49-52).

(Tr.53,72-

filed

her

tax

her previous

It was not until 1984, the year that the

parties were married, that the parties filed a joint tax return.
(Tr.52).

The

record

shows no evidence

that

the parties held

themselves out as husband and wife nor required a uniform and
general reputation as being husband and wife.

The parties knew

that they did not have a marriage like relationship evidenced by
16

the fact that they decided to have a solemnized marriage on October
5, 1984.

(Tr.5)
Regarding

the property

acquired

and

the

retirement

benefit's earned prior to the solemnization of the marriage, the
equitable provisions of §30-1-17.2 would also be inappropriate to
apply in the instant case.

"To hold otherwise would legitimate

a knowing common law relationship the legislature had expressly
declared invalid."

Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P2d at 1181.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES WHERE THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL NEED
Attorney's fees in divorce actions may be ordered under
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989).

There are two requirements which

must be met before a court can award attorney's fees.

"The trial

court must find the requesting party is in need of financial
assistance that the fees requested are reasonable."

Bagshaw v.

Bagshaw, 192 Utah Adv.Rep. 53, 55 (Ct.App. 1990); Riche v. Riche,
123 Utah Adv.Rep. 31, 34 (Ct.App. 1989); see generally Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, 745 P2d 1276, 1279-80 (Utah 1987); Beals v. Beals, 682
P2d 862,864 (Utah 1984); Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P2d 476,480
(Utah Ct.App. 1988).

^ §30-1-17.2 pertains to property accumulated subsequent to
a marriage. A copy is attached in the Addendum.
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The

trial

court

heard

no

evidence

Plaintiff's need for financial assistance.

regarding

the

It relied on the

Plaintiff's attorney's Affidavit In Support of Attorney's Fees in
awarding the Plaintiff ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) "based on
need and the relative ability of the parties to pay." (R.115).
In the Affidavit of Support of Attorney's Fees, the
Plaintiff's attorney proffered that the Plaintiff was totally self
supportive from income earned from her present employment at Geneva
Steel.

(R.lll).

Also, in the adopted

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law it was found that neither party appeared "to be
presently in need of or entitled to the continuing financial
support of the other, either in the form of alimony or child
support."

(R.149).

At the time of trial, Plaintiff had been

reemployed by Geneva Steel for approximately one (1) year. (Tr.3637).

Her total gross income for 1988 was TWENTY SIX THOUSAND ONE

HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO and 40/100 DOLLARS ($26,182.40).

(R.lll).

Prior to the solemnization of the marriage, the Plaintiff
received great assistance from the Defendant who paid for a number
of debts and obligations of the Plaintiff's.

The expenses paid

by the Defendant enabled the Plaintiff to preserve her assets.
These expenses totalled TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-ONE
DOLLARS ($10,371.00).

(Ex.13).

The Plaintiff is free from these

Supra page 7 of Brief.
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debts and obligations and little if any payments are still due on
the trailer in which she resides.

The Defendant has assisted the

Plaintiff with trailer payments totalling at least THREE THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($3f000. 00).
It was

(Ex.13).

improper

for

the

trial court

to award

the

Plaintiff attorney's fees without determining that the Plaintiff
was in financial need.

CONCLUSION
The Fourth Judicial District Court erred by establishing
a marital relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant
beginning on or about January 1, 1980, though the parties did not
solemnize their marriage until October of 1984.

Utah Code Ann.

§30-1-4.5, which recognizes properly formed common law marriagesf
was not enacted until 1987. Such statute has only prospective, and
not

retroactive/

relationship

must

effect.
be

Alsof

established

the

common

during

or

law

within

following the purported marriage like relationship.
trial

court

mischaracterized

the

parties

marriage
one

year

Thus, the

relationship

as

a

marriage. Awarding the Plaintiff property and retirement benefits
acquired
legitimate

prior

to

the

a

knowing

solemnization
common

law

of

the

relationship

marriage
of

would

which

the

legislature has expressly declared invalid.
The trial court also erred by awarding the Plaintiff
19

attorney

fees without establishing that the Plaintiff was in

financial need.
The Defendant asks that the Court remand this case to
the Fourth Judicial District Court to enable it to redistribute the
real property and retirement benefits acquired by the Defendant
prior to the solemnization of the marriage.

The recognized date

of marriage should be that of October 5, 1984 the date in which
the parties had a solemnized marriage. Also, it is inappropriate
for the Plaintiff to be awarded attorney fees as there is no
evidence that she is in financial need.
DATED this 7^

day of May, 1990.

AwK'

ROBERT L. MOODY
TAYLOR, MOODY & THOlME
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the T^

day of May, 1990, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Thomas H. Means,
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 363 North University Ave., Suite
103, Provo, Utah 84604; postage prepaid.

•hjUri
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IN THE' FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

P:l
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

^

*•***•*•**•**•*•*•***

HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

-vs-

CV 87 2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

****••**•*•**••******

The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement,
will rule at this time.
The Court finds that the parties in this action are
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party.
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when
the marital relationship between the parties began.
The Court
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was
actually solemnized.
The Court considered a number of factors in determining
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among" these is the
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's 'trailer with
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and
did not charge rent.
The plaintiff made improvements on the

l

property such as would be expected of a married couple*
The
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission.
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state,
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January
1st, 1980.
This is an approximate date because the Court does
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date.
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the
defendant retires.
If for any reason the defendant does not
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff.
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator
consists of the number of years or months they were married
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government
and the denominator is the total number of years or months
defendant was in such employment."
Marchant, at 206.
The
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires.
If
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they
may wish -to consider a cash settlement of the retirement
benefi ts.
2

The real property which is at issue was partially
acquired before the marriage, and partially after.
Considering
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for,
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the
real property.
The plaintiff is to receive the property in
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear,
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove- property
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that
property.
The Court finds that this is a fair division of the
property which was either acquired or paid for during the
marriage.
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those.
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account,
and $2750.00 of the America First account.
The Court has no evidence of values with which to
divide the disputed personal property of the parties.
The
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a
division of property between themselves, or having one party
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and
the proceeds divided.
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees
upon submission of affidavits by counsel.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the
Court for signature.
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Dated this 15th day of February, 1989
BY

RAYXM. HARDING, JUDG
cc:

Robert L. Moody, Esq.
Thomas H. Means, Esq.
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THOMAS H. MEANS
Attorney for Plaintiff
81 East Center
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
V

]
]|

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES

]

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Utah

: ss
)

]|

No. CV 87 2408

'

Your affiant, upon his oath, swears and deposes as follows:
1. My name is Thomas H. Means; I am an attorney in good
standing, licensed by the Utah State Bar and holding Utah State Bar
card #2222. I am experienced in the litigation of the character
presented by this action.

2. I am attorney of record for the party as indicated above.

1

3. In my capacity as attorney of record for such party I have
reviewed the file and record of this matter, have consulted with my
client and others, have advised my client by telephone and office
visits, have prepared and filed pleadings, have discovered the
facts attendant to the issues, and have appeared in a
representative capacity for and with my client at each and all
hearings as may be indicated by the file of this matter.
Specifically, actions necessitated by the exigencies of this matter
include the following:
Ex Parte Motions for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, and Order to Show Cause,
Affidavits and Temporary Restraining Order and Order to
Show Cause, meetings and consultation with Sheriff,
Hearing of Order To Show Cause, Stipulation, Preliminary
Injunction, Order, consultation with Pleasant Grove
detective and Pleasant Grove City Attorney regarding
Defendant's first violation of Temporary Restraining
Order, pre-trial hearing, Pre-Trial Order, Affidavits in
support of and second Motion for Order to Show Cause,
second Order to Show Cause, hearing on second Order to
Show Cause,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and

Judgment Upon Order to Show Cause, consultation with
Pleasant Grove Police and Utah County Attorney regarding
2

Defendant's second violation of Preliminary Injunction,
three sets of Plaintiff's Interrogatories, and
Certificates of Service, three sets of responses to
Defendant's Interrogatories, review of records of Utah
County Recorder, four Lis Pendens, telephone consultation
with pay clerk at Hill Air Force Base, consultation with
real estate appraiser, telephone consultation with banks
and credit union regarding accounts, multiple meetings
and consultations with investigator, research of case
law, Subpoenas for records and appearances (8), telephone
consultation with Alpine School District, research of
federal right to privacy law [USCA, Section 552(a)] and
Motion to Compel for response to Subpoena, consultation
with parties' tax preparer, review of Defendant's tax
returns, trial preparation, trial, Release of Lis
Pendens, drafts of final Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, Decree of Divorce. Qualified Domestic Relations
Order, Affidavit in Support of Attorney's Fees,

4. I have contracted with my client to provide such services,
consultations, and representations at the rate of $60.00 per hour.
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5. I have dedicated 11.52

hours to date in representation of

my client in this matter•

6. As per said fee agreement, and through 19 March, 1989, my
client has incurred the following expenses in this action:
attorney fees
advances-service costs
filing fees
recorders fees
witness fees
accounting costs
investigations
appraisals
total

$4651•00
27.00
87o00
40„00
14,00
32c00
500.00
450.00
$5801.00

7. To date my client has expended $1782.00 toward the abovenoted expenses of this action.

8. The present unpaid balance of the expenses of this action
is $4019.00 all of which balance constitutes unpaid attorney's
fees.

9. I believe such rate and such total fees at this stage of
the proceedings to be reasonable, given the amount in controversy,
the time necessarily expended by me in the matter, the relative
complexity of the matter, and the comparable rates charged and time
that would likely be dedicated to such representation by other
4

competent attorneys licensed to practice in this Court, and I
further believe the various actions taken in Plaintiff's behalf in
the prosecution of her claims have been reasonable, necessary,
supported by good cause, and not frivolous nor brought in bad faith
nor for delay nor harassment.

10. After-accruing fees will be as set forth in a Supplemental
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, if appropriate.

11. Your affiant proffers that Plaintiff is totally selfsupported from income earned from her present employment at Geneva
Steel, that in addition to supporting herself she is responsible
for the total support of her daughter Shirley Schantell Hunter
(Walters) whom she has custody of, and is partially supporting
another adult daughter, Angela Cassingham, who lives with
Plaintiff, who maintains part-time employment with a janitorial
service, and who is afflicted with a disease which presently
prevents her from maintaining full time employment and from living
alone, to wit Guillain-Barre Syndrome.

12. At the trial of this matter Plaintiff gave testimony of
her total gross income for 1988. It is your affiant's recollection
that said total was $26,182.40.
5

13. The legal basis for an award of attorneyfs fees is Section
30-3-3, Utah Code and the established law regarding awards of
attorney's fees in actions for divorce as set forth in decisions
such as Kerr v Kerr, 610 P2nd 1380, Beals v Beals, 682 P2nd 862,
Cabrera v Cottrel, 694 P2nd 622, Talley v Talley, 739 P2nd 83,
Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P2nd 1276, Porco v Porco, 752 P2nd 365,
Rasband v Rasband, 752 P2nd 1313, Aspar v Aspar 753 P2nd 978,
Andersen v Andersen, 757 P2nd 476, Sorensen v Sorensen, 102 UAR 14,
and Maughan v Maughan, 102 UAR 44. I believe Plaintiff justly
deserves an award of attorney's fees and that such award to
Plaintiff is supported by the facts and circumstances of this
matter and the statute and decisions above cited.

Dated this '*2{0 day of

J/ff^h^

1989.

iditias H. Means
Thomas
Affiant
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On the

^?/Q

day of

MftfZCl-l

1989, personally appeared

before me, Thomas H. Means, who duly acknowledged executing the
foregoing Affidavit,

Notary Public
(seal)
Resi<

My commission expires:
Kv

— o , UT y v
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
*********************

HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
CASE NUMBER

Plaintiff,

CV 87-2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

-vsLEWIS MARK WALTERS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.

*********************

The Court, having reserved the issue of attorney's fees
in this matter will rule, and will award the plaintiff $1,000.00
based on need and the relative ability of the parties to pay.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare an order incorporating
the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to filing with the Court for signature.
Dated this 31st day of July, 1989.
BY

cc:

Thomas H. Means, Esq.
Robert L. Moody, Esq.

1

J

II. I

• 1 I H P:•«,!,».

Li

' I. I

i -"fi.MvT

•„ >: . • > , . , '83

THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
3 63 North University Avenue
Suite 103
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
v

]
;|

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

]|

NO. CV 87 2408

]

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter,
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter
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under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now
hereby enters the following.. . . .

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior
thereto.
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short
period when Plaintiff's mobile home was situated at 155 South 1200
West, Orem, Utah.
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist.
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on
or about 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was
then located at 155 South 12 00 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home
has been the minor's only home.
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial.
8. During the parties1 marriage Plaintiff has been an employee
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately
one year.
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either
in the form alimony or child support.
3

10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized.
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated.
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports
such finding is as follows:
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4
December, 1978.
bo At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West,
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile
home.
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name,
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that
4

same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections.
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the
realty as her residence.
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling,
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of outbuildings and a metal building.
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the
realty.
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain
Plaintiff and her daughter.

5

ho Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission,
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile
accident.
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended
school under Defendant's family name of Walters.
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982, and 1983.
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and
1984.
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties'
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage.
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00.
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether
6

these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account.
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of
four parcels of realty, to wit:
a. Parcel 1625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot
Concord.
b. Parcel 2640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home.
c. Parcel 36072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
d. Parcel 4746 West 600 North, Orem, Utah
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977,
7

reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately
$5,000.00.
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court's acceptance into
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser.
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreauxfs assessment of the valuations
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for
the following reasons:
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to
each parcel.
8

Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements,
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout,
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion,
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties,
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost.
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties.
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general
contractor of residential construction "from 1971 to 1974, that he
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor,
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association.
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit:
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home:
9

$20,000.00

Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000*00

Parcel 3, with improvements:

$10,000,00

15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant, 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App
1987). The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant
was in such employment."
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for
which either party is liable either jointly or individually.
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980
Chrysler automobile.
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979
Chevrolet pick-up truck.
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital
relationship.

11

20c Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000*00
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint,
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees.

12

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her
marriage to Defendant.
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his
marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other.
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow.
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the
remainder of each account.
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7c Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,

Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty

and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship
that existed between the parties both prior to and after
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of
the monitory values of the properties.
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West,
14

Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties' 1980 Chrysler automobile.
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate
property the parties' 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
11. It is proper that the parties' personalty as noted in
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds
therefrom divided equally between them.
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v
Marchant, 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff!s proportionate share
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter,
15

(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement,
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove.
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00.
Dated this y

day of -Aage&t, 1989.

Approved as to form:

16

Robert L. Moody
Attorney for Defendant
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THOMAS H* MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
3 63 North University
Suite 103
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84 603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
V

]
;|

AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

]

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

]I NO. CV 87 2408

Defendant.
This matter, having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
her marriage to Defendant,
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
his marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
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the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987.
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a
$400.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is
hereby awarded the remainder of each account.
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More
particularly described as:
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to
Plaintiff.
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right,
titls, and interests in and to the parties1 realty and improvements
- including the mobile home - situated at 64 0 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff
harmless therefrom,
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile.
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold,
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties.
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment with the federal government during the marital
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her
3

share of such benefits until Defendant retires. If Defendant
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as well as a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her.
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby
ordered to pay as and for Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees
the sum of $1000.00.

/J

>

Dated this >J/<-/, day of August, 1989.

Fourth Judicial District
Utah County
Approved as to form:

Robert L. Moody, #2302

TAYLOR, M O O D Y & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
2525 North Canyon Road
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone 801-373-2721
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

SCHEDULE SHOWING RESIDENCY OF
PARTIES PRIOR TO MARRIAGE

vs.
LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

Case No. CV 87 2408
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

HELEN

MARK
Meets Helen
Montana
Highland, Utah
Missouri
Highland, Utah
Rapid City, S.D.
Cheyenne, Wyoming
Grand Fork, N.D.
Grand Fork, N.D.

December, 1978
January-August, 1979
August-October, 1979
October, 1979-May, 1980
June-July, 1980
August, 1980-March, 1982
March, 1982-February, 1984
February, 1984-July, 1984
July, 1984
IfDATED this k~ day of February, 1989.

Meets Mark
Orem, Utah
Orem, Utah
Orem, Utah
P.G., Utah
P.G., Utah
P.G. , Utah
P.G., Utah
Grand Fork, ND

h\M IK

ROBERT L. MOODYI

TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant

1 DEFENDANT'S
* EXHIBIT
NO.
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Robert L. Moody, #2302

TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Defendant
2525 North Canyon Road
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone 801-373-2721
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,

SCHEDULE OF REAL PROPERTY

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV 87 2408
Judge Ray M. Harding

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.
COMES

NOW

the

Defendant

and

hereby

submits

the

following schedule of property:
(1)

6072 West 9600 North
Acquisition Date:
Purchase Price:
Cost of Improvements:
Present Value:
Encumbrances:

July 1977
$ 8,000.00
$10,000.00
$20,000.00
$
0.00

Plaintiff's appraisal
(2)

$|0,000.00

625 South 50 West
Acquisition Date:
May 5, 1980
Purchase Price:
$11,500.00
plus water and sewer hook-up $2,150.00
Cost of Improvements:
$13,000.00
(not including Plaintiff's mobile home)
- 1 -

* I

Present Value:
Encumbrances:

$26,000.00
$
0.00

Plaintiff's appraisal $20,000.00
(including Plaintiff's mobile home)
(3)

640 South 50 West
Acquisition Date:
July 19, 1985
Purchase Price:
$10,500.00
plus water and sewer hook-up $2,165.00
Cost of Improvements:
$
0.00
Present Value:
$13,000.00
Encumbrances:
$ 5,000.00
Plaintiff's appraisal $20,000.00
(including Defendant's mobile home)

JL
DATED this (p -

day of February, 1989.

RT L. MOODY (J
ROBERT

TAYLOR, MOODY & TH0RNE
Attorney's for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY
1989,

CERTIFY

that

on the fo^" day of

February,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the

Plaintiffs's attorney, Thomas H. Means, P.O. Box 2283, Provo,
Utah 84603; postage prepaid.

- 2 -

Robert L. Moody, No. 2302

TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE

Attorneys for Defendant
2525 North Canyon Road
P. 0. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

EXPENSES PAID BY DEFENDANT
TO ENABLE PLAINTIFF TO
PRESERVE ASSETS

VS.

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

Civil No.

CV 87 2408

Defendant.
J u d g e Ray M. H a r d i n g

I.R.S.

$4,000.00

State Tax Commission

$2,700.00

Payment on Trailer

$3,000.00

Payment on Car Loan

$400.00

Payment on T.V. Loan

$150.00

Wyoming Accident Bills

$1,000.00

Costs to move Trailer
from Orem to Pleasant Grove

$521.00
$10,371.00

TOTAL:
DATED t h i s

(A

(g-

day o f F e b r u a r y ,

1989.
\

1 DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
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30-1-4.5

HUSBAND AND WIFE

30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out
of a contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the
provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
History; C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted b y L.
1987, chc 246, § 2.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch.
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap-

ter 246, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter is to be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unauthorized
person — Validity.
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have authority
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority, if consummated in the
belief of the parties or either of them that he had such authority and that they
have been lawfully married.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, 5 1187;
C.L. 1917, § 2970; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-1-5.

Cross-References. — Authorized person required to solemnize marriage, * 30-1-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Foreign common-law marriages.
This section does not render valid a commonlaw marriage entered into in a foreign state

where such marriages are recognized In re
Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P 2d 183
(1946).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. J u r 2d Marriage
^§ 39, 106.
C.J.S. — 55 C J S. Marriage o 29
A.L.R. — Validity of marriage as affected by

lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it.
13 A L.R.4th 1323
Key Numbers. — Marriage c=» 27
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30-1-1
30-1-30.
30-1-31.
30-1-32.
30-1-33.
30-1-34.
30-1-35.
30-1-36.
30-1-37.
30-1-38.
30-1-39.

HUSBAND AND WIFE
Premarital counseling — State policy — Applicability.
Premarital counseling board in county — Appointment, terms, compensation,
offices — Common counseling board with adjacent county.
Master plan for counseling.
Conformity to master plan for counseling as prerequisite to marriage license —
Exceptions.
Certificate of completion of counseling.
Persons performing counseling services designated by board — Exemption from
license requirements.
Activities included in premarital counseling.
Confidentialness of information obtained under counseling provisions.
Fee for counseling.
Violation of counseling provisions — Misdemeanor.

30-1-1. Incestuous marriages void. Marriages between parents and
children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, brothers and sisters
of the half as well as the whole blood, uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, first cousins, or between any persons related to each other within and
not including the fifth degree of consanguinity computed according to the
rules of the civil law, are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate.
Correct name of married woman, 35 ALR
History: R.S. 1898, § 1183; L. 1907, ch. 29,
§ 1; C.L. 1907, § 1183; C.L. 1917, § 2966; R.S. 417.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-1-1.
Death, right to attack validity of marriage
after death of party thereto, 47 ALR 2d 1393.
Compiler's Notes.
Duty of husband to provide necessaries for
Analogous former statutes, 2 Comp. Laws wife as affected by her possession of indepen1888, ch. V, §§ 2583 to 2601.
dent means, 18 ALR 1131.
Habit and repute as essential to commonCollateral References.
law marriage, 33 ALR 27.
Marriage <£=> 10.
Mental capacity to marry, 82 ALR 2d 1040.
55 CJS Marriage § 16.
Presumption as to validity of second mar52 AmJur 2d 914-919, Marriage §§ 62-66.
riage, 14 ALR 2d 7.
Cohabitation: liability of one putative
Subsequent marriage as bar to prosecution
spouse to other for wrongfully inducing entry for rape, 9 ALR 339.
into or cohabitation under illegal, void, or
Validity of common-law marriage, 39 ALR
nonexistent marriage, 72 ALR 2d 956.
538, 60 ALR 541, 94 ALR 1000, 133 ALR 758.
Constitutionality of marriage statutes as
Validity of marriage as-affected by intenaffected by discriminations or exceptions, 3 tion of the parties that it should be only a
ALR 1568.
matter of form or jest, 14 ALR 2d 624.

30-1-2. Marriages prohibited and void. The following marriages are
prohibited and declared void:
(1) With a person afflicted with syphilis or gonorrhea that is communicable or that may become communicable.
(2) When there is a husband or wife living from whom the person marrying has not been divorced.
(3) When not solemnized by an authorized person, except as provided
in Section 30-1-5.
(4) When the male or female is under sixteen years of age unless consent is obtained as provided in Section 30-1-9.
(5) When the male or female is under 14 years of age.
120

MARRIAGE

30-1-17.2

30-1-17.1. Annulment — Grounds for.
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes existing at the
time of marriage:
(1) When the marriage is prohibited or void under Chapter 1 of Title
30.
(2) Upon grounds existing at common law.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.1, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 65, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Juir. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Annulment of
Marriage §§ 3-42,
C.J.S. — 55 C J S Marriage § 50.
A.L.R. — Concealment of or misrepresentation as to prior marital status as ground for
annulment of marriage, 15 A.L.R.3d 759.
Religion: concealment or misrepresentation
relating to religion as ground for annulment,
44 A.L.R.3d 972.
Identity- what constitutes mistake m the
identity of one of the parties to warrant annulment of marriage, 50 A.L.R.3d 1295

Incapacity for sexual intercourse as ground
for annulment, 52 A.L.R.3d 589
Finances: spouse's secret intention not to
abide by written antenuptial agreement relating to financial matters as ground for annulment, 66 &.L.R.3d 1282.
Validity of marriage as affected by lack of
legal authority of person solemnizing it, 13
A.L.R.4th 1323
Key Numbers. — Marriage «=> 58.

30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of marriage — Orders relating to parties, property and children —
Legitimacy of children.
If the parties have accumulated any property or acquired any obligations
subsequent to the marriage, or there is a genuine need arising from economic
change of circumstances due to the marriage, or if there are children born, or
expected, the court mav make temporary and final orders, and subsequently
modify the orders, relating to the parties, their property and obligations, the
children and their custody and visitation, and the support and maintenance of
the parties and children, as may be equitable. The children born to the parties
after the date of the marriage shall be deemed the legitimate children of both
of the parties for all purposes.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-17.2, e n a c t e d b y L.
1971, ch. 65, § 3[a].

Cross-References. — Nunc pro tunc entrv
of orders. *j 30-4a-l

NOTES TO DECISIONS
marriage, was adopted Lopes v Lopes, 30
Utah 2d 393, 518 P 2d 687 d974)

ANALYSIS

Lord Mansfield rule
Settlement.
Lord Mansfield rule.
The Lord Mansfield Rule, wherebv spouses
mav not give testimonv which would tend to
^legitimatize child born to wife during the

Settlement.
Court which granted annulment had authority to grant wife a $1,200 bettlement to enable
her and her son bv a prior marriage to return
to her native Thailand Maple v Maple, 566f
P 2 d 1229 (Utah 1977)
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